Introduction
A substantial debate has emerged over the financial impacts of nonutility generation (NUG) contracts on investor-owned utilities. This debate is reflected in Section 712 of the 1992 Energy Policy Act (EPAc0, which requires state regulatory commissions to consider whether long-term contracts for NUG power purchases would increase (or decrease) the utility's cost of capital.
The basis for the concern expressed in Section 712 of EPAct lies in the manner in which NUG power projects are financed. The vast majority of these facilities use a structure known as "project financing." This structure relies upon long-term purchase contracts with utilities that provide an assured market and price for electricity, subject to performance requirements. 1The long-term contract, in particular the capacity payments that they typically entail, is perceived to be a contingent liability to the utility. In the language of the bond-rating agencies, these contracts are "debt equivalents." One observer has summarized this argument succinctly:
"...the power purchase contract which allows the non-utility to go in and get the financing is...an asset to the NUG, [therefore] it's a liability to the utility. ''2 1The terms and conditions associated with power purchase contracts between NUGs and utilities are reviewed, see E. Kahn, "Risks in Independent Power Contracts: An Empirical Survey," The Electricity Journal 4:9:12-23, . happens whether there are explicit reactions from industry spokesmen or not. For example, secondary market prices Zor bonds of electric utilities which had nuclear power assets reacted to the Three Mile Island accident reacted even if there was no direct risk to credit quality. 8 It is in this spirit therefore, that we want to study the arguments about NUG impacts on the utility cost of capital. We want to structure the arguments in a form which will potentially allow them to be confirmed or disproved.
i,
This study is organized in the following fashion. Section 2 reviews the literature on the cost of equity capital for regulated utilities. Since there is no consensus definition of the intuitive "cost of capital n notion, we will have to work with several alternative formulations. Section 3 specifies our formulation of the debate on NUGs and the utility's cost of capital. Section 4 reviews variable definitions and data sources. Section 5 discusses statistical issues and results. Conclusions are given in Section 6.
Literature Review
There is no generally accepted definition of the cost of equity capital, but only a number of competing theories that are more or less capable of being applied numerically. In this section we survey a number of these theories, particularly as they apply to regulated public utilities. We describe their conceptual foundations and required assumptions. Kolbe et al. (1984) 9 give a general survey of the literature on estimating the cost of capital for regulated firms. Their emphasis is on methods used for establishing the allowed rate of return for public utilities in rate hearings. They separate the approaches in use into five categories, and review each according to specific criteria on theoretical consistency and ease of use. Two of these approaches are so qualitative and judgmental in nature that they are not amenable to the kind of statistical methods that we wish to employ. The remaining three approaches are sufficiently quantitative that they can be used for empirical work. These are: (1) the discounted cash flow (DCF) method, (2) the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and (3) the market to book value ratio (MBV). From these we distill three estimators for the cost of equity capital (re): (1) a DCF estimator, (2) the earnings price ratio (EPR), and (3) the CAPM equation. All of these methods rely primarily on stock market prices, but require additional data that must be -" estimated in particul_tr cases as well. We review each of these methods below.
Discounted Cash Flow
The discounted cash flow (DCF) method is an application of the standard present-value calculation to the market price of a utility stock, based on its expected dividends and their rate of growth. The formula for present-value calculations is given by the following expression ,., (1 where CFy = cash flow in year y, PV = present value, and r = the discount rate.
The DCF model is based on the equivalence of the stock price, P, with the present-value of dividends, Dy, which are the cash flows in year y. The DCF model also requires two simplifying assumptions, namely: (1) that the discount rate r remains constant in the future, and (2) that dividends are expected to grow at a constant rate, g, into the indefinite future (i.e. Y in the present-value expression is infinite). Under these assumptions, the present-value definition of the stock price caO be re-written as
Po = _ D°'(1 +s)y = D°'(1 +g) -D1 ' 1 (1 +ry (r-g) (r-g)
Solving this equation for r, and reinterpreting it as the cost of equity capital, r_, gives the standard form of the DCF model
re -P0 which says that the cost of equity capital is the sum of the expected dividend yield (paid at the end of period 1) at the time of purchase (ex-dividend stock price at time 0) and the steady state expected growth rate of dividends in the future. Most of the difficulty associated with using the DCF model centers upon the estimation of the expected growth rate g.
The crucial step in the above argument is the reinterpretation of the stockholder's discount rate as the firm's cost of equity capital. To understand this, first note that the firm must maintain the value of existing stock when issuing new stock. If it does not, it will find its ability to raise funds in the equity market seriously impaired (and eventually eliminated if it persists in devaluing its stock), and its costs in the bond market will increase. In order to maintain the value of existing stock, total stock value must increase by the amount of the funds raised by a sale of new stock. For this to occur, the firm must increase its stream of dividends by an amount with a present value equal to the new stock price. Thus the cost of raising $P is a dividend stream with present value $P when evaluated at the stockholder's discount rate, r. This dividend stream is exactly equal to the interest payments that would be made on $P borrowed at r%; this justifies equating r with the firms' cost of equity capital.
When using equation (1) to estimate the cost of equity capital, by far the greatest empirical difficulty arises from the estimate of the expected growth rate of dividends, g. Kolbe et al. give five methods for estimating g, to which we add a sixth.
1.
Historical growth rate of dividends.
2.
Historical growth rate of earnings.
3.
Historical growth rate of book value per share. 4.
Widely used forecasts of growth rates.
5.
Retained earnings to book value ratio. 6.
Retained earnings to market value ratio.
Because we are concerned with the future cost of equity capital and how it may be changed by the future impact of new contracts the first three estimates are inappropriate. We will implement the fourth method using various publicly available estimates of the growth in dividends per share as our estimate of g. The fifth method seems clearly inferior to the sixth because book value is simply market value distorted by various accounting conventions. As Kolbe et al. show, the sixth method simply reduces to the well know earnings-price ratio (EPR) method and we will also make use of this approach. We now demonstrate that DCF with the sixth estimation method for g reduces to the EPR method. First, replacing g in the DCF equation with the ratio of retained earnings to market value, RE/P.
Then, since dividends plus retained earnings add to total earnings, E, we have arrived at the basic EPR formula,
This estimator of r_ depends on the assumption that a firm can earn only its cost of equity capital, no more and no less. If the firm can earn more than the cost of equity capital, then the growth rate expected from a given level of earnings is greater, and thus g > RE/P. Carrying this inequality through the derivation yields rc > E/P. The converse applies if the firm earns less than the cost of equity capital. This point will "equire further consideration since the change in the cost of equity capital that we are looking for would necessarily disturb any prior equality between ROE and r_.
CapiUd Asset Pricing Model
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the approach best grounded in economic and financial theory. Based on an equilibrium model of investor behavior and market valuation, standard business school textbooks on corporate finance favor this approach. _°T he principal advantage of CAPM is that it provides a precise and measurable definition of risk as applied to stocks. The risk measure, called beta, is proportional to the correlation between the rate of return of a particular asset with the rate of return for the market as a whole _. This measure of risk is then related in a straight-forward fashion to the cost of equity capital through the basic CAPM equation as follows
where E(rj) = the expected rate of return on asset j (i.e. the cost of equity capital), rf = the current risk-free rate of return, /3j = the risk measure for asset j, E(r_) = the expected rate of return for the market.
CAPM asserts that the expected rate of return is just the risk-free rate, rf, plus a risk premium that is given by the risk measure,/3, multiplied by "the market price of risk" (MPR). The MPR is the bracketed term in the CAPM expression, namely the difference between the expected rate of return for the market as a whole and the risk-free rate of return. The equivalence between the stockholders' expected rate of return and the cost of equity capital can be justified by the same argument that was used to equate the stockholders' discount rate with the cost of equity capital.
CAPM has a number of problems in the translation from theory into practice. Difficulties arise in the estimation of all its parameters. Empirical tests of CAPM have been ambiguous. A number of adjustments or re-formulations of CAPM have been proposed.
Market to Book Value Ratio
The market to book value ratio (MBV) provides a third approach to the cost of equity capital. MBV is usually expressed on a per share basis. The book value per share of a regulated firm is the rate base net of accumulated depreciation and debt divided by the number of shares. When MBV equals one, then the allowed rate of return equals the cost of equity capital. The argument for this proposition is a variation on the present-value logic underlying the DCF model. The 11The proportionality constant is the ratio of the standard deviation of the asset's rate of return to the standard deviation of the rate of return for the market as a whole. I I starting point for the argument is the same, the market value of any stock should approximately equal earnings, E, capitalized at the cost of equity capital, r; MV = E/r. Notice that this is exactly our basic EPR formula (with P renamed MV).
Next we observe that earnings, E, is given by the allowed rate of return, ROR, times the net book value of the firm, BV. This can be expressed as E = ROR x BV. Putting these two facts together and solving for r we get
MY MV MBV
Notice that since MV is just a new name for P, this formula will be identical to equation (2) if the definition of E is the same. Equation (2) presumed that E was actual earnings, so if ROR is defined to be actual ROR earned on book value, this formula is identical to (2). On the other hand, if ROR is defined as the allowed rate of return, then E will be the allowed earnings which are typically different than actual earnings. This provides a new way of computing the cost of equity capital.
ROR_,_,d r = MBV
This definition would be advantageous if allowed earnings were a better proxy for expected earnings in future years than are this year's actual earnings. We will not employ this method because of a lack data for allowed rate of return.
Summary of Cost of Equity Capital Estimators to Be Used
We have now settled on three estimators of the cost of equity capital that will be used throughout the remainder of the paper, and in particular will form the dependent variables for our regressions. These are
It is import to spend some time clarifying the mechanisms by which these estimators could • reflect the changes in the cost of equity capital caused by NUG contracts or commitment to capital expansion. The case of the second estimator is most straight forward; if stockholders believe that the utility's future earnings are made more risky by its commitments, then the price " of stock will fall. This argument also holds for the first estimator, but in this case there is an additional effect which works through the estimate of g. Since this estimate is provided by market analysts, their judgment concerning the impact of the utility's commitments will play a role independent of stockholder's views.
The third estimator can only be effected through/_, the covariance of the utility stock's rate of remm with the market rate of return. Since any fluctuation in earnings must be absorbed by stockholders (i.e., the creditors having a prior claim), increasing the debt-equity ratio reduces the base over which these fluctuations are spread. 12 Since stock prices depend on earnings per share, and having a smaller base means greater percentage fluctuation in earnings per share, it also means greater fluctuations in the stock price. This in turn leads to a larger/_. Thus anything that effectively increases a utilit_"s debt-equity ratio should also increase its/_.
Problem Formulation
Our goal is to study the debt equivalence debate empirically. This means establishing a general framework in which to examine those determinants of the utility cost of capital which are relevant to this debate. In this section, we first outline a qualitative approach to this problem. Second, we specify the basic form of an equation that will be estimated empirically. Third, we discuss how to specify the generic kinds of variables in the basic equation.
Qualitative Formulation
There are two sides to the debate over NUGs and the utility cost of capital. The debt equivalence argument suggests that there should be a positive correlation between the degree to which utilities are obligated to NUGs and their cost of capital. The alternative to contracting with NUGs is that the utilities construct their own facilities using their own credit. The utility construction alternative is not without financial risk either. Firms may have to sell securities that will reduce interest coverage for bonds and dilute earnings for shareholders. During the last major round of utility construction, these burdens proved substantial. Additionally, the risk of regulatory disallowances had a negative effect on utility finances. One study of the utility cost of capital which examined data from 1983 and 1984 found that forecasted construction expenses has a significantly negative effect on the market to book value ratio for a sample of 30 electric utility stocks (PHB, 1986) . This finding is equivalent to a positive correlation between r_ and utility construction expenses. A reasonable representation of the buy versus build debate should incorporate the possibility of finding both effects. In the next section we outline a simple model which posits that the utility's cost of equity capital can be determined by either utility construction or NUG purchases.
Basic Equation
The effect of NUG contracts is hypothesized to be an effective change in the debt-equity ratio. Therefore, to model the impact of NUG contracts on the cost of equity capital we begin with a model of the effect of the debt-equity ratio on the cost of equity capital. Kolbe, Read, and Hall give two versions of this relationship, first developed by Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963) . These are:
where rwis the weighted cost of capital, r_, is the all-equity cost of capital rd is the cost of debt, r, is the cost of equity, and t is the tax rate. There has been a long debate over these two positions, but fortunately we do not need to resolve this controversy. In either case, the relationship between D/Eq and r= has the following form:
NUG contractshave capacitypaymentswhich are thoughtto be equivalent to debt paymentsand thusimply a value for the equivalent debt. Calling this NUG "equivalent debt" Dn, we find the utility's debt-equity ratio to be (D + cx.Dn)/Eq, where ot will be called the risk factor and indicates the extent to which Dn has a debt-like impact on the utility. This gives rise to the expanded costof equity capital equation:
Becausewe are unsure of the accuracyof available estimates of a, in some caseswe omit _.
Now in order to accountfor the effect of utility constructionprojectswe mustinclude onemore variable. We start with CWIP, which is projected utility capital expenditures(on construction work in progress). This variable is usually available for only three future yearsand sometimes for five. This short time period doesnot allow us to computeaccuratelythe presentvalue of the work in progress (some of which might take 5 to 7 years). Thus, the best we can do is use the • sum of the first three years, which we call C, asa proxy for the future growth in capital stock.
Since we expect the impact of the CWIP variable to be proportional to its magnitude but inversely proportional to the equity base that its impact is spread over, we enter it in our stochasticequation as C/Eq. This brings us to our basestochasticmodel:
Note that equity, _, acts as a normalization divisor for all three variables, thus assuring a homoscadastic error term.
If B2 > B3 then the regression favors the hypothesis that buying NUG power raises the cost of capital relative to utility funded construction. To determine the statistical significance of our result we will test the hypothesis that 82 -f13;only if we can reject this hypothesis can we reliably conclude that one or the other side of the debate is probably correct.
If the bond rating agencies are correct, then we would expect a positive relationship between NUG and r., or/32 >0. Our expectations for CWIP are more complicated. We know of no theory indicating that CWIP should have an impact on G, but that does not role out the possibility, On the other hand, the Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, Inc. (1986) (PI-IB)13 study previously cited would suggest that CWIP may raise _ because of risks associated with potential disallowances.
The PHB study's result may have been a product of the nature of regulation during the period studied. Rothwell and Eastman (1987) 14argue that both allowed and earned returns in the US electric utility industry were below the cost of equity capital at approximately the time studied.
In such cases, it is profit maximizing for the utility to minimize investment. 15 Under more favorable circumstances, i.e. when returns exceed the cost of equity capital, then investment might be neutral or favorable. This effect does not directly bear on the cost of capital but it can affect one of our measures of it. As previously noted E/P measures the cost of capital only in the case of zero expected earnings growth. CWIP in the presence of a rate of return above the cost of capital will produce and increase in expected earnings. Thus in a favorable regulatory environment, CWIP may be negatively correlated with E/P. This would be indicated by t3 < O. In fact we get this result and discuss its meaning in more detail when it is presented.
3.3

An Expanded Model
Our basic equation focuses on the policy debate in which we are interested, but may omit • important variables that could explain variations in the cost of equity capital. There is a tradition of modeling the cost of equity capital for electric utilities which typically includes operational and regulatory variables as well as managerial and financial variables. There are potentially a number of such variables that might be added to our basic equation. Since sample size is constrained by data limits, we want to limit additional variables to the potentially most important ones. Previous studies have identified fuel mix and "regulatory climate" as among the more important sources of variation.
The representations of fuel mix vary in the previous work. In some cases, the specification emphasizes expensive fuels, lein other _, the risks associated with nuclear power. 17Since fuel costs are currently low, we will use nuclear power as a measure of operating risks. To measure the exposure to risk we use the ratio of nuclear assets to total electric utility plant, n We refer to this variable as NUKE. We would expect the sign of the coefficient on this variable to be positive; i.e. nuclear assets increase the cost of capital because they are risky.
"Regulatory climate" is a general term which describes the degree of stringency appli_ by st_j.te regulatory commissions to investor-owned utilities. It is a composite of many factors including the generosity of allowed rotes of return, the effect of regulatory lags, and accounting procedures. Investment and research firms regularly publish rankings of state regulation. These have been found to be significant variables in previous studies of the cost of equity capital. _9,2°R egulatory factors have also been found to be significant source of variation in the cost of electric utility debt. n We use a regulatory climate variable that we refer to as PUC. The source of the data is Merrill Lynch (1993). This source gives numerical ratings to regulatory lej.Dubin,and P. Navarro,"Regulatory Climateand theCostof Capital." Regulatory Reformand Public Utilities, ed.M. Crew (Lexington Books,1982). commissions going from 1 (unfavorableto investors) to 5 (favorable to investors). We would expect the sign on the coefficient of this variable to be negative; i.e. a favorable regulatory climate would reduce risk and hence also reduce the cost of capital.
Adding these two additional variables results in an expanded model of the following form
We will test whether the expanded model has more explanatorypower than the basic equation.
4
Measurement Issues
Def'mitions of Regression Variables
Each of the regressions deriving from our basic equation makes use of four variables: cost of equity capital, re,the debt-equityratio, theratio of NUG "debt"to equity (i.e. NUG), projected utility capital expenditures (i.e. CW/P). This sub-section defines those variables in terms of constituentvariables thatare availablefrom sources thatare discussed later in this section. The additionalvariablesused in the expandedmodel are simple, and the source of the datawas given above.
r,
The utility cost of equity capitalcan be measuredthroughthree different proxies: (1) the DCF approach, (2) its variantthe EPR, or (3) the CAPM approach. We will test each as a dependent variable. The required constituentvariables are:
1) D
The stock dividend. P The stock l:,rice.
The expected growth rate of the dividend.
2) E Earnings. P The stock price.
3) 19
Beta, the covarianceof the stocks returnover thevariance of market return. rf
The risk-free rate of return. E(r, ) The expected market rate of return.
D/E The debt-equityratio is self explanatory; it requires. x_ The utility's debt ratio (debt divided by debt plus equity).
CW/P This variable is forecast by the utility, and includes constructionexpenses for T&D as well as for generation. It is typically not forecast very far into the future (3-5 years). This variable must be present valued and normalized to accountfor variations in firm size. Since its effect on the cost of equity capital will be inversely proportionalto the value of the firm's equity, just as is true with debt, we normalize by dividing by the firm's equity. Thus CWIP is defined as:
NUG This is a pseudo "debt"-equity ratio due to capacitypayments to non-utility generators, and must reflect the multi-year commitment to those generators. The present-value of this payment stream represents a first approximation to their debt equivalence. As a second approximation we will use the Standard and Poor's utility-specific "risk factors" as a means of weighting these payments to account for differences in terms and conditions of the contracts. NUG and its constituent variables are defined as follows:
Dn Equivalent "debt" due to NUG (derived from x_ and x2). xl standard debt ratio. .... x2 debt ratio "adjusted" for NUGs a Standard and Poor's "risk factor".
A detailed discussion of variables follows, though it should be noted that alternative approaches are possible, one of which would be to construct a NUG variable from EIA data on NUG capacity using proxy costs for different fuel types.
To explain the constituent variables we focus on Moody's data. z2 They present a table giving an unadjusted and an adjusted debt fraction for each of 51 investor owned utilities. It is useful to give explicit definitions of these concepts. First, the standard (or unadjusted) debt fraction is given by
where xl is the debt fraction, Db is the total amount of debt and Eq is the total amount of equity (including preferred shares). The adjusted debt fraction is given by
where Dn is the equivalent debt associated with power purchases. Since, for our regression we will need NUG = Dn / Eq instead of x2, we must solve for NUG in terms of x_ and x2. This is easily done by defining dn = Dn/(Db+E_, and eq = Eq/(Db+E_, and noting that Dn/Eq = dn/eq. We then find:
, and ¢q = I -x t.
This implies the first formula for NUG given above.
The equivalent debt, Dn, is a capitalization of capacity or demand-related payments. The bond rating agencies make calculations of this kind. Moody's uses certain simplifying assumptions to standardize their calculation of Dn. They assume that 60% of annual purchased power payments are capacity-related, z_ that contracts are 25 years in length, and that the present-value of the future capacity payment stream should be discounted at 10%. _ They assert that this results in assuming that every $1 in annual capacity payments is equivalent to $6.5 in impute:l debt. zs Duff and Phelps (1992) _suses a capitalization method which results in a much smaller eqvivalent debt. ,: They assume that only 20% of purchased power expense is capacity charges, but they capitalize this at 10 times, resulting in an equivalent debt that is 2 times annual purchase power costs. Although these methods are somewhat arbitrary, because they affect all NUG values by a constant factor they will bias the NUG coefficient, but they will not affect its t-statistic.
An important issue that should be examined is whether differences in the risk characteristics of NUG contracts are reflected in the NUG variable. If NUG values could be correctly adjusted for risk, that should improve the t-statistic, in other words it would make our statistical tests more sensitive. The Standard and Poor's approach to this issue allows for variation in risk by using a "risk factor." We illustrate how this works. If we designate the appropriate risk factor by c_, then we can write down a "risk adjusted NUG "debt"-equity ratio," NUG2 as follows .Dn NUG 2 -23 The 60% figure is difficult to verify for a number of reasons, the foremost of which is dispatehability. Capacity payments are fixed, while total power purchase costs depend upon dispatch. A recent study of private power pricing found that capacity related payments were typically closer to 50 % for high capacity factor operation. At low capacity factor, however, portions in excess of 70% can be expected. See E. Kahn, A. Milne, and S. Kito, The Price of Electricity from Private Producers, LBL-34578 (Berkeley, CA, 1993). 25 There is some ambiguity in the Moody's estimate. Taken literally, their method amounts to capitalizing capacity payments at a factor of 9, and total purchased power expense at a factor of 5.4 (=0.6*9). As explained in the note to Table 2 below, the actual capitalization factor used by Moody's seems to be 3.9 times total purchase power expense.
zs Duff, and Phelps, "The Purchase Power Commitment." (1992).
We will give an illustration of the differences between the definitions of NUGI and NIJG_ in Table 1 . This example takes two utilities that are highly dependent on purchased power and computes the quantities defined above. The estimates of the risk factor u are taken from Mockler (1993) , 27 who attributes them to Standard mid Poor's. These calculations show that the Moody's method estimates a substantially greater equivalent debt for Southern California Edison (SCE) than for Consumers Power (CP), although both are quite large compared to the strictly financial debt. As a result, NUG_ is bigger for SCE than for CP, even though the unadjusted debt fraction for SCE is quite a bit lower. When risk is taken into account, however, the rank ordering reverses. The risk factor for CP is much greater than for SCE.
The actual construction of the NUG variables is complicated by the fact that the available data produces a ratio of Dn to book equity, while what is needed is the ratio of Dn to the market value of equity. Appendix A describes the conversion from one to the other, which requires the use of the book-to-market ratio (B:M).
Def'mitions and Sourc_ of Constituent Variables
In the previous section we listed all of the variables needed to construct the four regression variables. In this section we define these constituent variables more precisely and indicate the source of values for each. 
NUG Data
In principle, we want to use data on NUGs for year-end 1992. The only publicly available estimates for that time period are those from Duff and Phelps (1993). 3_As indicated above, this is our starting point. The choice is not unambiguous, however, bex_use the Duff and Phelps estimation method is somewhat mechanical, and may include purchases, such as short-term economy energy, that are in no way equivalent to debt. The main competing source of data on NUG debt equivalence is Moody's 1991 estimate. This estimate may be more selective, q_laere is a problem, however, with its being one year out of phase with our other variables. We illustrate the most extreme example of this time lag problem.
If the dependence of individual utilities upon NUG purchases were stable betw_n 1991 and 1992, then using 1991 as a proxy for 1992 would be reasonable. Unfortunately, it is not. The best, if most extreme, example of this is the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC). Table 2 summarizes the problem. 31Duff, and Phelps, "Electrics: By the Numbers," (July 1993). Table 2 are based on Moody's 1991 calculation of the adjusted debt ratio and NMPC's 1992 Annual Report. The term "Debt" includes Long term debt, Short term debt and Long term debt due within one year. "Equity" includes both common and preferred. The adjusted debt ratio is computed using Moody's capitalization method. 32
The calculations in
The change in the Adjusted Debt Ratio in Table 2 reflects the substantial growth in NUG payments by NMPC between 1991 and 1992. Other utilities, such as Consumers Power or Southern California Edison, did not experience such large changes between 1991 and 1992.
As an alternative to the direct est._matesof debt equivalence, a physical approach is also possible. EIA has data on NUG energy purchases and capacity commitments of utilities as of 1991. This data has the advantage of eliminating other purchases, such as short-term economy energy, from consideration. It is not available for 1992, which makes it insensitive to changes between 1991 and 1992. As an alternative to the financial NUG variables, based en Duff and Phelps data, we also test a physical NUG variable, which we call NUG3, defined as the ratio of NUG energy purchases to total sources of energy for 1991.
Financially Distressed Utilities
A number of companies that might potentially be included in our sample are experiencing financial distress for one reason or another. This shows up in some of our cost of capital estimators in a number of anomalous ways. Value Line estimates the future dividend growth for Commonwealth Edison, for example, to be negative 7 %. This would give a very low DCF r,, which may not make sense since their beta is among the highest in the sample. The same arguments apply to Pinnacle West (i.e., Arizona Public Service).
There are two different approaches to deal with these situations. One option is to eliminate such companies from the database, and use regressions estimated on a smaller sample. Alternatively, we can use proxy costs of capital for these firms. The idea for a proxy is that intuitively we know that these are high risk firms. Therefore, they must have a high cost of capital. For some reason, the standard estimators do not result in a high risk re being assigned to them. As a proxy, we assign to such utilities a cost of capital that is arbitrarily higher than any observed in our sample, so that the anomalous data does not distort our analysis. For each cost of capital estimator, we assume that the financially distressed firms have a "true" value that is 10% more than the highest value observed. Thus for the DCF estimator, the highest observed value is 12.6%. By this procedure, we would use 13.86% for the financially distressed firms.
32The 1991 value is Moody's estimate; see Moody's Investor Services, "Moody's Continues to Weigh the Credit Risks of Purchased Power on Electric Utility Credit Quality," (September 1992). If we capitalize the $394 million at a factor of 3.9, we get the stated adjusted debt ratio of 0.664. Using a greater capitalization factor (as potentially indicated in note 7 above) would result in a larger adjustment. The 1992 data is used with the factor of 3.9 to produce the estimate given in Table 2. Although we prefer to exclude the financially distressed firms completely (to avoid the use of the proxy re), as discussed below, this is not possible in all cases due to other considerations.
Sample Selection
Sampleselection is crucialto the outcome of any statisticalanalysis, andboth size of sampleand method of selection deserve careful attention. We will examine sample size first.
Sample Size
There is no question but that increasing the sample size is valuable, especially for a relatively small sample. However, additional data points often come with attendant statistical problems. Common among these is autocorrelation. When analyzing time series data there is always a threshold beyond which increasing autocorrelation will negate the benefit of a higher sample rate. (E.g. sampling GNP daily, even if it could be done, would yield essentially no new information about macroeconomic fluctuations when compared with a monthly sample, even though this would increase sample size by a factor of thirty.)
In the case of the present study even sampling at an annual rate would produce a very high degree of autocorrelation. This is because the key explanatory variables, NUG and CWlP, both involve long-term (typically twenty-year) contracts or investments. Thus adding an adjacent year of data would add almost no new information to our current sample. It would however require that a difficult33correction for autocorrelation be made. Added to the autocorrelation problem is the fact that the year chosen was the one for which data was most readily available, so extend_,_ " ,revious years would mean decreasing the average reliability of the sample.
The seca_ndmethod of increasing sample size is to include more utilities. This process has already been pursued vigorously and it is not evident that more data points can be added with out sacrificing reliability or incurring undue cost.
Selection Bias
There are many ways to bias statistical results by improper sample selection, but perhaps the best know is truncation bias. This occurs when sample points with either high or low values of the dependent variable are omitted. This is best understood by considering a one variable regression with a regression line sloping up to the right. If points with a high y-value are omitted they will tend to be at the right end of the data set. Thus their omission will lower the average value for points on the right and reduce the estimated slope of the regression line. This ' produces a biased (and inconsistent) estimate of the slope coefficient.
33Difficult because we would have a set of time series each of which was only two periods long and this is not the case normally covered in the literature.
Another typeof sample selection chooses datapoints basedon thevalue ofan independent variable. This, by itself, doesnotbias coefficient estimates. Infact, thestatistical modelon whichmultiple linear regression ispremised assumes that anexperimenter chooses the values ofthe independent variables notbysomestatistically randomtechnique, butentirely deliberately. Inourcase, ifwe could haveafforded it, we wouldhaveconducted an experiment inwhich several utilities wereinstructed toimplement a veryhigh NUG value andan equal numberof others wereinstructed tohavea NUG value ofzero. Barring that possibility, we simply chose toinclude inoursample asmany firms aspossible with high NUG values, since thelowNUGvalue endofthesample tended tobewell enough represented. The point ofincluding extreme values istoincrease theaccuracy oftheestimates ofthecoefficients; points near the middle of therange tell usnothing about theslope oftherelationship between thecost ofcapital andthe value ofNUG. Thuswe werewilling toincur much greater dam-gathering costs forpoints near theextreme ofthedistribution.
This problem can be approached more rigorously as follows. Although the problem of truncation bias has been well know at least since Theft (1957),34Heckman (1979) 35is perhaps the best known paper on the topic, and formulates the problem quite generally. In his formulation, there will be no selection bias "In the case of independencebetween Uli and U2i," where U_iare the regressioa equationerrors and U2_are the selection equation errors. Now our selection criteria for utilities had a form that can be simply approximatedas follows:
Clearly, for any selection parameter,highervalues of NUG are more likely to be included. The error term is related only to the convenience of acquiring data, which should be unrelated to the error term in our regressions. It should also be noted that if we had simply selected all observations with NUG >/3, the error term would have been zero. If the selection error term is zero it is certainly independent of the regression error term. Thus using Heckman's formal model confirrr,z that our selection based on NUG values should not bias any coefficients.
Bias from Omitting Financially Distressed Utilities
There is one way in which the study does run the risk of truncation bias. Heclcmanwarns: "in studies of panel data, it is common to use 'intact' observations .... Such procedures have the same effect on structural estimates as self :.'lection: fitted regression functions confound the behavioral parameters of interest with parameters of the function determining the probability of entrance into the sample." In this study "intact" observations are those utilities that are not financially distressed, so Heckman is warning that the distressed utilities should not be omitted. 
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In defining our sample we came across seven financially distressed utilities as indicated by the fact that they were not paying dividends, or the fact that stock analysts were assigning negative growth rates to their dividends, or not even estimating dividend growth rate. Of these seven, five were omitted and two with the largest NUG values were retained. The omission of the five should be expected to bias our coefficients but not in a direction that would undermineour conclusions. Empirical implications of this selection bias will be discussed in section 5 below.
Special Cases
There are a number of cases where holding companies have substantial assets in non-utility businesses. Two particularlyimportantexamples of this kindare SouthernCaliforniaEdison and Consumers Power. In both instances the non-utility generation projects sell very substantial quantitiesof power to the affiliatedutility. These cases have attracte_much attention from state regulators,who have expressed concernaboutself-dealing, andhave imposed financialpenalties on the utilities in question. _ Because both of these companies are among the largest NUG purchasers, we do not want to exclude them from the analysis. Yet the very special circumstancesinvolving the self-dealingissue requirethat we run separateregressions with these companies in and out of the sample, so that we can isolate the effect of their special circumstances. The distressed financialconditionof ConsumersPower's parent company CMS Energy requires that we use the proxy method describedabove for its cost of capital.
Summary of Regressions Run
Here we list the total number of specifications of our basic equation that we test numerically. There are three versions of the cost of capital variable:(1) CAPM, (2) DCF and (3) EPR. For each of these dependentvariables we will use our three NUG variables. NUGt is the 1992 Duff and Phelps estimate, suitably normalized. NUG_ applies the Standardand Poors risk factor to NUGt. NUG3 is the 1991 physical NUG variable, takenfrom EIA data on non-utilitypurchases. Finally we run our basic sample of utilities without SCE and CMS (cases we designate as "N" for no self-dealing) and with SCE and CMS (cases we designate "S"). 
Characteristics of Regression Variables
Each regression uses as dependent variables both the debt-equity ratio, D/E, and a measure of construction work in progress CWIP. Also included on the right is one of three measures of non-utility generation, NUG1, NUG2, or NUG3. The dependent variable is one of three measures of the cost of equity capital, CAPM, DCF, or El'. Appendix A contains a complete listing of each of these variables, while this section presents their standard summary statistics. Although there are three utilities that are sometimes included and sometimes not, for the purpose of calculating the summary statistics we have included all utilities that are used in any regression. Table 3 gives the mean and standard deviation of each variable. Since both the NUG and cost-of-capital variables are estimated in three separate ways, it is interesting to see just how closely correlated they are. To that end we present a standard correlation matrix for each. Note that the correlation of CAPM and DCF is quite low. We believe this is attributable to the poor quality of DCF as a measure of the cost of equity capital. Notice also that NUG3 the physical measure of NUG capacity does not correlate especially well with the two financial measure, NUG1 and NUG2. In this case we suspect measurement errors in all three variables.
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$ Results
Omitted Variables
There are two reasons to include variables whose coefficients are not of interest. The first is to avoid the classic "omittedvariable" problemwhich biases the coefficients of interest, andthe second is to reduce the varianceof the error term andthereby reduce the standarderrors of the coefficients of interest.
The omitted variable problemoccurs when a causalvariablewhich is correlated with an included independentvariable is omitted from the regression. In this case the included variablepicks up some of the significance that should rightly be attributedto the omitted variable.
There is also a possible reason for not including an independentvariable that is not causal. If such a variableis correlatedwith an independentvariableof interestit will erroneously increase the standarderror of the variable of interest.
In section 3.3 we outlined the case for expanding our basic model to include potentially importantvariable.sthat were not included in the original formulation. When we include the two potential omitted variables, NUKE and PUC, we find the following changes in the CAPM regression statistics. Appendix B includes a complete listing of these regression results.
1. The adjusted R2 decreases for all six regressions. 2. The D/E coefficient decreases slightly for all six regressions. 3. The NUG coefficient increases slightly in four of six regressions. 4. The CWIP coefficient increases in magnitudeslightly for all six regressions.
The t-statistics get slightly worse on all 18 coefficients.
Two of these outcomes are particularly telling. First, the fact that adjusted R2 decreased indicates that the two "omitted" variables togetherprovided less new explanatory power than one would expect from two randomly generatedX variables. In other words, they could not haveperformed worse. This rules out the possibility that these variables shouldbe adopted for the second reason; to decrease standard errors.
Second, the fact that the CWIP coefficient increases in magnitude indicates that the standard omittedvariables problem cannotbe at work here. Therefore the increase in the standarderror of the CWIP coefficients comes from a small colinearity problem contributed by the new variables. The NUG coefficient behaves less consistently. Four times out of six it increases, it remainsunchangedonce and decreasesonce. Measuredin absolutetermsor in standarderror, the largest of these changes is the decrease. Thus if the addition of the new variables is ' correcting a bias, it is does this so poorly that it is not clear in which directionthe correction is being made. Again there is virtually no evidence for a omitted variable problem. The Debt/Equity variableis the only one with a coefficient that behaves as if NUKE and PUC were correlated,causal omittedvariables, although the effect is not particularlystrong--the coefficient changes by about 1/2 a standard error or less. In the DCF regressions, five out of six times the coefficient increases. So once again there is little if any reason to believe we are witnessing anything of statistical significance, especially given the fact the D/E is the variable with the strongest theoretical backing.
Basic Specifications
Regression results are listed in Table 6 for CAPM, Table 7 for DCF and Table 8 for EPR.
For each variable, the estimated coefficient is given, with the t statistic listed in parenthesis below it. Recall that t statistics in excess of 2 are requiredfor statistical significantat the 95 % confidence level.
CAPM
The CAPM specification of our basic equation has the most explanatory power based on both its adjusted R2and on the numberof significant coefficients. On theoretical grounds, we expect that the Debt/Equity variable should be positive and significant. It is only in the CAPM specification that this turns out to be the case. The DCF results (shown in Table 7 ) don't show a significant coefficient for Debt/Equity. The EPR results (in Table 8 ) show only marginal significance for this variable.
With respect to our central question, the CAPM specification gives unambiguousresults. The CWIP variable has a positive and significant coefficient. There is no significance to the NUG coefficient. This result suggests that utility construction does increase risk and raise the utility cost of equity capital. This result is consistent with the PHB finding from 1983 and 1984 data before NUGs played much of a role in the electricity industry. The result is diametrically opposite from the finding of Sudarsanam(1992)37for unregulatedindustries. It is possible that the hypothesis offered in the PHB study explains these results, namely that the source of the risk lies with the behavior of the regulator. Our study sheds no light on such questions.
It is also worth noting that the S versions of the regression have much higher t statistics on the CWIP variable than the N versions. This is largely due to CMS, which has both the highest values of the CAPM r_ and the CWIP variable. The coefficients in Table 6 have a straightforward interpretation. The average r_consists of three components: (1) the intercept term has a value of approximately 0.08, (2) The result is an average cost of equity capital of about 0.1038, which is approximately the average value of ro given in Table 3 . For a utility with CWIP that is one standard deviation above the average, the cost of capital increases by 0.005.
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Recalling our discussion of selection bias issues in 4.4, the omission of financially distressed firms raises the issue of selection bias effeeting coefficient estimates. Financially distressed utilities will almost certainly have a high cost of capital, thus omitting them from our sample, effectively truncates the sample from above. The result is to reduce in magnitude the estimates of -,all regression coefficients. The fact that the two distressed utilities with the largest NUG values were retained will result in the NUG coefficient estimate being less biased than other " coefficient estimates. Thus the CWIP coefficient is probably larger and more significant than we estimated it to be, and so is the NUG coefficient, but the effect is less for NUG. This means that our results indicating that the CWIP coefficient is larger than the NUG coefficients would probably be more certain if we had been able to include the omitted utilities.
The CAPM regressions can also be used to test whether our results contribute meaningfully to the build versus buy debate by conducting a statistical test of the hypothesis that the NUG -' coefficient differs from the CWIP coefficient. Four of the six regressions strongly reject this hypothesis while tw,_contradict it only weakly. These tests were conducted by computing an F statistic based on the R2of the full regression and the R2 of a regression in which the NUG and CW'IP eoeffici;nts were restricted to be equal. This F statistic is useful for testing the 25 tm hypothesis that the coefficients are in fact equal. Since in each case the CWIP coefficient is greater than the NUG coefficient, any hypothesis that the NUG coefficient is greater can be rejected with even more certainty. The Table 6A presents these results. 
DCF
The DCF specification (summarized in Table 7 ) performs poorly. Only two of the eighteen coefficients has a t statistic greater than 2, and these are both on CWIP. This is approximately what one would expect from chance, though there may be another weak indication that CWIP is positive and has a stronger impact than HUG.
One interesting coefficient in the DCF specification is on the NUG variable in case S2. This result may also be driven by the CMS data. As the discussion of Table 1 indicated, Consumers Power has a significant NUG equivalent debt even after adjusting for risk using the Standard and Poors risk factors. CMS, the parent of Consumers Power, is a financially distressed company, for which we use a high proxy value for r_. SCE, on the other hand, has a high NUG value in the S 1 case, but a much lower value in the S2 case. Its r_ is in the middle range. Therefore, the change in significance for the NUG variable between S1 and $2 seems largely due to CMS. 
EPR
The EPR specification (summarized in Table 8 ) resembles the DCF results. The coefficients for Debt/Equity are closer to significance than for DCF. Again, we have only two significant coefficients; it is the same as in Table 7 ; again case $2 produces the most positive value for NUG. Table 8 also shows some interesting differences between the N and the S versions regarding the t statistics on the CWIP variable. Although none of the N case coefficients are significant, we get much better performance in these cases than the S versions. This is due again to CMS, which has very high values of ro and CWIP. When these are removed a more clearly negative relationship begins to emerge between CWIP and EPR. In the next section, we explore this in more detail and perform an additional test which will l'.elp elucidate our basic question. 
Special Interpretation of the Earning-Price Ratio
Careful examination of Table 8 shows that CMS, a utility that is financially distressed, introduces a potentially spurious correlation between EPR and the CWIP variable. One reason why CMS has a high value for the CWIP variable is that we have normalized construction expenses to the market value of the firm's equity. Since the firm is financially distressed, the market value of the equity is relatively low. This is a property that all financially distressed utilities will tend to have. If we remove these extreme cases from our sample and re-estimate the equation without them, we may get results that have less noise in them. Table 9 summarizes the results of such cases, which we designate by L. We have eliminated CMS and Niagara Mohawk from our sample, since these were the only two firms for which we used proxy values for r_. We include SCE in the sample. Table 9 shows a negative coefficient on CWIP in the E/P regression. As noted previously this probably does not indicate that CWIP reduces the cost of equity capital, because E/P ignores earnings growth, for which CWIP may be a reasonably good proxy. This does not make the result uninteresting, but does suggest a closer look at the mechanisms involved. We begin by reviewing E/P as measure of r_.
As we noted in Section 2.1, when E/P was developed as a measure of r_, it is the same as DCF but with the growth in dividends assumed to be exactly RE/P, retained earnings over price. This assumption is at best an approximation, but when CWIP is included it becomes a serious misspecification. This is because CWIP could be correlated with the difference between 28 dividend growth and R_P, thus E/P does not pick up one of the main ways in which CWIP affects ro. To interpret the results of the E/P regression we will need some additional information; fortunately this is supplied by both the DCF regressions, and the CAPM ' regressions. The DC_ regressions indicate that CWIP has essentially no effect on r_, or more precisely essentially no effect on E/P + (g -RE/P). However the E/P regressions indicates that CWIP has a negative impact on E/P. Obviously the difference between these two results can be explained by the unobserved effect of CWIP on (g -RE/P). Clearly this must be a positive effect in order to cancel CWIP's negative effect on E/P and produce no net effect on E/P + g. The correct interpretation of the E/P CWIP result appears to be that an increase in CWIP causes both a decrease in E/P, and an increase in (g -RE/P). Or, more to the point, CWIP does not effect r_, but it does lead to expectations of that dividend growth will be greater than RE/P, which occurs only if the return on capital is greater than the cost of capital.
There is a slight indication in two DCF regressions that the CWlP coefficient is positive, and the CAPM regressions give a strong positive correlation. Therefore, we should check whether or not this would change our interpretation. In fact it does not, it only reinforces it. If CWIP causes E/P + (g -RE/P) to go up but E/P to go down, then its impact on (g -RE/P) must be even more positive than we had thought.
The results are less conclusive regarding NUG, it appears to have a positive coefficient in the E/P regression and a slightly smaller, but still positive, coefficient in the DCF regression. These results are so weak as to be almost not worth the bother of interpretation, but if true they indicate that NUG has a positive effect on E/P and causes a very weak reduction in expected earnings growth. The combination of these two appears to result in a small increase in the cost of equity capital.
Before leaving the interpretation of the E/P results it is worth examining the underlying ' economic mechanism. The most straight forward explanation is based on CWIP being undertaken when a utility finds an opportunity to make a return that is above the cost of capital. , In this case one can expect earnings-per-share to increase in the future when the project is brought on line. This increases the present value of the stream of expected future earnings without increasing currentearnings. Since stock price, P, _flects the PV (expected earnings), it will increase and E/P will decrease. This explains the negative coefficient in the E/P regression. Since the decrease in E/P is exactly cancelled by the increase in the expected growth of earnings, these two effects explain the insignificant coefficient in the DCF equation.
Conclusions
Our principal finding is that we cannot detect any evidence to support the debt-equivalence hypothesis. At least as far as the cost of equity capital is concerned, we find more evidence to support the notion that utility construction raises the cost of capital than that NUG purchases do. This finding tends to support arguments made by NUGs on this issue.3s This conclusion is supported by reasonably strong statistical results from the CAPM specification. There was no confirmation of this result from the DCF specification. The EPR results appear to suggest that utilities can earn more than the cost of capital from new construction, even if construction activity is risky and therefore somewhat more costly than purchasing from NUGs. Our results tell us nothing about the source of the risk associated with CWlP. It is entirely possible that it lies with the regulator, rather than with the firm.
If these results are correct, they imply that the buy versus build debate, insofar as cost of capital questions are involved, is not about the ratepayer impacts of NUG purchases. Rather, our results suggest that this debate is really about the long-run prospects for shareholder earnings; i.e. that it is a market share conflict.
These conclusions must be tempered by a frank assessment of the data quality upon which the statistical analysis rests. The NUG data in particular is quite weak. We have relied on the best publicly available compilations, but they are highly imperfect. We expec' this situation to improve over time. It would be interesting to revisit these questions when t_, data quality is better.
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Appendix A
Methodology for Constructing Variables 4
A.1 Cost of Capital Variables
The following page contains the input and final regression variables used to represent the three dependent variables used in our analysis. These variables include a Capital-Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) estimate, a discounted cash flow (DCF) estimate, and an earnings-price (F2') estimate. For each measure we report an "Unadjusted" and an "Adjusted" value. Unadjusted values were calculated accordi_g to the methodology outlined below. We do not think that the "Unadjusted" values accurately reflect the cost of capital for financially distressed firms. As a proxy, we assign to such utilities a cost of capital that is arbitrarily higher than any observed in our sample, so that the anomalous data doesn't distort our analysis. For each cost of capital estimator, we assume that the financially distressed firms have a "true" value that is 10% more than the highest value observed. Using these "true" values produces the reported "Adjusted_ values.
A. 1.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model CAPM is calculated for each company using the following equation: 
A.2 Construction Work in Progress Variables (CWIP)
The following page contains the input and final regression variables used for the independent variable CWIP. First, we obtainedforecast annualconstructionexpenditures for 1993 to 1995 from each company's SEC 10-k filing. We then calculated the net present value of these expenditures using a 10% discountrate. We normalizedthe net presentvalue figure to equity. The following equation describes this procedure:
A.3 Computing the D/E and NUG1, NUG2, NUG3 Variables
The following four pages contain the input, intermediate and final regression variables used to represent the debt-equity ratio and non-utility generation. The definition of the variables on the first of these pages can be found in section 4.2 of the report. We now present the equations for the subsequent three pages; the variable names used in these equations appearat the tops of the columns.
The first four intermediate variables are determined as follows.
UD:E is unadjusted debt/equity. UD:C is unadjusted debt/capital. UE::C is unadjusted equity/capital. AD:C is debt/capital adjustedfor NUGS. "hug1" is NUGI before equity is converted to market value (nug2 is similar). EqP is preferred equity, and EqC is common equity. Finally, the four independent regression variables are determined as follows.
The first two NUG variable have now been expressed as a ratio of NUG debt to the market value of common equity. In section 3.3 we outlined the ease for expanding our basic model to include potentially important variables that were not included in the original formulation. Previous studies have identified fuel mix and "regulatory climate" as among the more important sources of variation. We use the ratio of nuclear assets to total electric utility plant as a proxy for fuel mix, and Mertil Lynch's rating of state public utility commissions as a proxy for "regulatory climate." In section 5.1 we summarize the important differences between the original regressions and this expanded model. In this appendix, we present the results of the expanded regression model. 
